

  
**United States  
Global Strategy Council**

August 2, 1983

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Old Executive Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Ron:

I appreciated the opportunity to meet with you on July 28, 1983 to discuss Council affairs. I would like to elaborate on some of our thinking which we did not fully cover. What follows is a brief summary of some concepts which are intended to promote the design of a strategic approach to global conflict for America. The first activity related to these concepts would center around a concept for a "pronouncement strategy" from which structural and procedural matters could evolve, first informally and then formally. I think the time is ripe to take this kind of initiative.

The article entitled "Regroup to Check the Soviet Thrust" in the April 22, 1983 issue of the Wall Street Journal by William J. Casey, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, is the best reflection of our overall conceptions that I have seen in recent months. In my opinion, the key word is REGROUP.

That article points to the fact that the Soviets have designed a new strategy for the Third World and that it has worked and listed its achievements. Casey also points out that "The U.S. needs a realistic counter-strategy" and that "It is past time for the American government -- Executive and Congress -- to take the Soviet challenge in the Third World seriously and to develop a broad, integrated strategy for countering it."

The article further points out that "The Executive branch must do more to educate the public, the Congress and Third World governments about Soviet strategy in the LDC's generally" and "the Executive branch needs to collaborate more closely in the selling of strategy with key members and committees of Congress." Note the emphasis on the word "strategy."

Before the question of how this can best be done is addressed, it might be useful to point out some of our basic conceptions:

- (1) Strategy is based on a special orientation in thinking that broadens one's ability to cope with change and conflict in the global environment.

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- (2) Strategy is a major component of the whole U.S. national security equation.
- (3) The use of strategy, or what may be termed the strategic approach, facilitates the most effective management of national resources employed in the pursuit of U.S. international goals.
- (4) There must be a "climate for strategy" in the government that both allows and rewards initiatives in the field of strategy.
- (5) Part of the creation of a "climate for strategy" involves replacing the term "foreign policy" and the like with a term like "global strategy" for clarity in thinking, since "foreign policy" is too ambiguous and therefore confusing to strategists as well as to others.
- (6) Another part of the creation of a climate for strategy involves looking at the various departments of the Executive branch in terms of their actual strategic functions, bearing in mind that structure follows strategy. There must be some semblance of harmony between any organizational structure and the strategy, with the strategy having priority.
- (7) The term "pronouncement strategy" would be a major integral part of a global strategy as a useful way of explaining both to our own people and to those in other nations what our global outlook is all about and why. This could be considered the public relations aspect of strategy.
- (8) Any meaningful U.S. strategy requires what might be termed "strategic harmony" of a bipartisan nature and this could be envisioned as a bipartisan global strategy in lieu of what was formerly referred to as a bipartisan foreign policy.
- (9) The inherent weakness in the conception of a separate set of "foreign policies" and "defense policies" that by tradition originate in the State and Defense Departments respectively needs to be overcome.

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How can the goals stressed in the article "Regroup to Check the Soviet Thrust" be achieved and as a corollary, how can the conceptions of the Council be related to those goals?

A suggested approach might be to create an Office of Strategic Affairs in the Executive branch as a first stage. If this stage is accomplished in a satisfactory manner, the next stage could be a Committee of Strategic Affairs in each body of the Congress having as its members the chairmen of the respective armed services, foreign relations, appropriations, government operations, budget and intelligence committees. There could eventually be a Joint Congressional Strategic Affairs Committee.

Needless to say, moves to create such structured bodies would involve a full discussion of strategic concepts and their relevancy in the global environment so that the process would by itself determine whether a climate for strategy can in fact be created by and between the Executive branch and the Congress as envisioned by William Casey in his article, and also whether such a thing as a U.S. global strategy can be designed and accepted for implementation. The REGROUP would be underway.

In an effort to make clearer the reasoning behind what might seem to be an initial structural approach to strategy, perhaps it might be useful to relate some observations as a result of efforts over the last two and one-half years in trying to be helpful to the Reagan Administration.

In a paper entitled "The Case for a U.S. Global Strategy" dated May 1, 1981, the basic conceptions had been formulated for a strategic approach which the Council currently pursues. At this point, we sensed that the problems in connection with this kind of approach were enormous and, therefore, new ways of proceeding had to be developed.

In our view, the conventional "think tanks" type of operation would be a time-consuming one and might take as long as ten years before there was any appreciable effect. This was based on a review of what existing "think tanks" had actually accomplished during a like span, which according to the information we had was virtually nothing. Such a time-frame would be of no benefit to the Reagan Administration.

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As a way to overcome this time span problem, in August of 1981, a proposal was submitted to a high official in the Executive branch for the establishment of a global strategy council as an advisory arm of the President. Underlying the proposal was a conception that if we indeed had major problems in the strategy field, a way to popularize such ideas was to have a very high level and thus visible body with the intellectual capacity and stature to promote a strategic approach. A process would then have been initiated that could grow with the proper nourishment.

There were a number of other features envisioned relative to that body. The important thing to be emphasized is that at the time no one was sufficiently curious to want to explore the matter. The response to the proposal was a brief letter stating that existing institutions would be made to do. Other proposals were made before and since then with an equal lack of curiosity in exploring their ramifications. If the intent reflected in William Casey's article "Regroup to Check the Soviet Thrust" is to be pursued now, it would seem that perhaps valuable time has been lost by the lack of curiosity; two years to be exact.

This intentionally sarcastic observation is made to emphasize a point. At no time during the last fifty years or so has any U.S. administration designed a process that enabled it to truly cope with the hostile forces at loose in the world in a way that had lasting effect. Each Administration in its own way has developed policies and programs in the hope of achieving results in the world. Each failed in its turn because the hostile forces do not conform to policies and programs. They employ strategy in a fluid state that manifests itself as a surprise and a crisis to us.

We as a nation do not now have a broad, integrated strategy because we have not heretofore realized the need for one. We become entrapped by disagreements over each particular crisis which tends to further disunite us and render us less effective. Connecting the current crisis or event to others that have occurred over the last 50 years or so is something we neglect to do. It's like making a judgment on the nature of a mountain range on the basis of one photographic snapshot. It is not enough to guide us in our actions.

Related to this and underlying the concept of a "pronouncement strategy" is the hypothesis that what might be needed most of all is a frank admission that in essence the Soviets and their allies have

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simply outclassed us in the field of global strategy over the last 50 years and as a result we as a nation cannot "fit the parts together" in a meaningful way without taking truly decisive measures in a number of different areas which many are reluctant to consider for a good and sufficient reason. This kind of thing is difficult to accomplish unless a broad political approach has been developed to support it. It is easy to reflect that such a broad political approach would consist of a truth campaign by its nature. To accomplish it in a satisfactory manner is another matter. Yet, a properly crafted "pronouncement strategy" might turn out to be a way to start.

We have a tendency to act like a dog that chases its tail. Our elected officials tend to pursue the popularity needed for electoral success while quietly neglecting the need to establish an organized process for coping with global conflict. As the inevitable is delayed, the global problem intensity rises in severity as the years pass which only increases the tendency among those in the American body politic to wonder what is really going on, and with this doubt comes hesitancy in supporting proposed actions.

The concept of a pronouncement strategy in the form of a truth campaign could conceivably be applied to our current situation in Central America, if we look at that area as a microcosm of the larger East-West global conflict. A sample short version of an educational effort directed toward the Congress and the public could be as follows, bearing in mind that other versions are available:

1. The common elements are clear. A conflict for power and influence between two systems of governing people where those that represent the East's way have developed a combined political and military effort to attain power under the banner of social progress defined in traditional Marxist terms. This drive for power constitutes an organized process led by a cadre of trained leaders conscious of their part in the vast global conflict. As such, these leaders understand that while their visible goal is power within their own country, their subliminal goal in common with their other allies of the East is to create stress conditions within the United States itself that magnifies the disunity and disorientation. That is our heritage and that is sustained by the memory of Vietnam.

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2. Underlying what should be considered a conscious effort to create a climate which forces the United States to directly identify itself with seemingly obsolete kind of government in its own strategic interest, the corollary goal is to portray such a reaction in terms that also create disunity and disorientation among and between the United States and its European allies. This is intended to further the isolation of the United States in the eyes of the peoples of the world.
3. These common elements of the hostile organized process are not new. They are in reality now an almost traditional way that the East patterns its moves. The French experience in Indo-China and Algeria are examples. The U.S. experience in China and Vietnam are other examples. This is the global view of the hostile leadership cadre that inspires them to continue in pursuit of their aims, knowing that their principal adversary has not developed a clear process for coping with it, meaning us.

If we indeed view current events in Central America as a micro-cosm of the larger East-West global conflict, the implications are clear. How we handle that situation will effect what happens in other parts of the globe. If we can develop an organized process, a strategy, that enables us to cope with that microcosm we know as Central America, we will then have a standard with which to apply to other areas in the global conflict. If we flounder there, we can expect more of the same in other areas in the future.


Therefore, since William Casey suggests we need to regroup, perhaps we need to regroup intellectually before we try to regroup physically. A properly crafted "pronouncement strategy" should help us do this. We will then have a basis for proceeding with the structural aspects of strategic affairs in general.

We need to demonstrate that we are capable of handling global affairs in a way that reinforces the conviction of other peoples that our role as the leader of the free world is fully justified, while at the same time promoting a sense of harmony among our own people.

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As one member of the Council has reminded us, while the reality of strategy is important, the perception of a clear global strategy by our citizens as well as by other nations is more important. And perceptions are easier to sustain about the truth than about falsehood. People and nations act in response to their perceptions of reality, not necessarily reality itself. This is what something like a "pronouncement strategy" can help do for us.

Sincerely,



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